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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This document provides a survey of the technical literature related to Command and 
Control (C2) link security for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and their operation 
in the National Airspace System (NAS).  This work was tasked under the Command, 
Control, and Communications (C3) Work Package of the Access 5 program.   
 
Access 5 is a national program sponsored by the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) and leading the way in enabling Unmanned Aircraft (UA) to 
routinely fly with other aircraft in the NAS.  The Access 5 program consists of a 
strategic government/industry alliance to develop standards, regulations, and 
procedures; demonstrate the technologies; and implement infrastructure necessary to 
meet national priorities.  To that end, Access 5 is investigating technology, 
procedures, and policies needed to operate UAS in the NAS safely and routinely.  
The results of the program will be the basis of recommendations to the FAA to 
implement the certification procedure for UA and UAS. 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Communications security is a very high priority issue for UAS in the NAS because it 
directly impacts the safety of the UAS and other aircraft, people, and property.  If 
communications are compromised, injury, damage, delays, degraded operations, and 
loss of service could result.  For instance, an interloper could issue commands to the 
UA that would cause it to collide with another UA, causing the loss of both aircraft. 
 
As shown in Figure 1, the C2 link is the data conduit between the vehicle and the 
pilot-in-command (PIC) on the ground.  The PIC controls the UA from the Air 
Vehicle Control Station (AVCS) by sending messages to affect the dynamics (such 
as attitude, altitude, and speed) of the UA.  The UA sends data to the pilot to keep 
him/her informed of the flight status, health and status of the UA, and conditions 
surrounding the UA.  In general, the C2 link may be a point-to-point link or involve 
a shared-media network. 
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Figure 1. In the UAS, the C2 Link is Between the UAV and Control Station 
 
The C2 link can be considered the most critical part of the UA operations since the 
PIC is not physically onboard the aircraft to handle events in person.  Therefore the 
C2 link requires security measures in order to prevent unauthorized access to the 
control of the UA. 
 
In general, communications security encompasses a wide range of topic areas that 
are addressed in the documents included in this survey.  These topics include the 
following, all of which are applicable to security of the C2 link: 
 
a. Access Control – limit access to only authorized personnel or entities 
b. Authorization – determine if requestor is allowed to have access 
c. Authentication – confirm that a sender is who they claim to be  
d. Non-repudiation – verify that a sender or recipient is the one who claimed to     
    send or receive a message; then cannot later deny sending or receiving 
e. Attacks – methods to steal, corrupt, or remove information, such as jamming or  
    denial of service attacks 
 
1.2 Purpose 
 
The purpose of this technical literature study is to gain a broad understanding of 
communications security as applicable to C2 links for UAS and for future integration 
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into the NAS.  The objectives are to status current security for C2 links; identify 
issues relevant to C2 links, the NAS, or technology that make security more difficult 
to attain; and determine the direction that C2 link security is going.  This study will 
provide an overview of technical approaches that are currently used, being evaluated 
for use, under development, and concepts for the future. 
 
From the study results, we can identify open issues, define subsequent tasks in C2 
link security, and recommend initial C2 link security functional requirements.  These 
results will be further evaluated and applied to an Access 5 task planned for FY06 to 
develop functional requirements for the C2 link security for the UAS. 
 
1.3 Scope 
 
The scope of this technical literature study is to research documentation in the open 
literature that covers communications security relevant to C2 links.  These 
documents can address communications security in general or specifically in 
aviation.  The documentation can be in a variety of forms, such as official 
regulations or standards, minutes of working groups or committees, industry or 
Government presentations, documents of commercial advances, and research papers.   
 
1.4 Focus on C2 Link Security for UAS 
 
Not only is communications security a broad issue but also the implementation of the 
C2 links may vary from one UAS manufacturer to the other.  In addition, the ATN 
has been in operation for years and it is evolving to add more services as 
technologies and demands progress.  In some areas, the ATN may have covered the 
services for sending command and control messages.  However, most of them are 
ATC related communications for the human pilot in front of the cockpit. 
 
In this study we focus on the relatively new perspective: namely, the C2 messages 
that  are used to affect flight control functions and operations and the links that are 
dedicated to the UAS.  More specifically, the communications security for C2 links 
requires timely protection and detection against threats.  This is the main difference 
in communication needs between the current major UA operations and manned 
aircraft.  On the other hand, we do not mean to exclude any traditional ATN 
operations that potentially will be applicable to UAS flight control in the future.  
Thus, we are also very interested in analyzing gaps in these established standards and 
procedures in the literature.  In general, we focus on transmission security while 
being watchful of communications security involving conventional cryptographic 
methodology. 
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2 APPROACH FOR STUDY OF LITERATURE 
 
This section describes the sources we examined for this study of communications 
security literature.  Security covers a wide spectrum of topics and there is a vast 
amount of open literature available on these topics.  We focused on the technical 
areas that will help with the development of functional requirements for C2 link 
security for UAS in the NAS.  Therefore, Access 5 internal documents are a good 
starting point, since they serve as the reference for technical direction.  Existing FAA 
policies and regulations specify current rules that are followed, while technical 
working groups address new issues and work toward formulating recommendations 
for aviation and the FAA.  The Government has also published standards and 
procedures related to security.  Activities within the aviation and commercial 
communications industries are another good source for security literature.  
Publications from academic, commercial, and government-sponsored research 
provide insights into the latest advances in security.  These sources can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
 Access 5 Internal Documents 
 FAA Policies and Orders 
 ICAO / ATN 
 Government Standards and Procedures 
 Aviation Industry Activities 
 Commercial Communications Industries 
 Research and Academia Activities 
 
2.1 Access 5 Internal Documents 
 
Two Access 5 internal documents report findings from an independent study funded 
by the Access 5 program in FY04.  These documents identify and assess 
communication security issues for operating UA in the NAS.  We used these 
documents to gain an understanding of the current state of communications security 
for UA.  From this information, we can identify gaps related to C2 link security and 
efficiently define follow-on work to this literature survey. 
 
2.2 FAA Policy and Order 
 
The FAA is the highest administration office that manages the national airspace 
system (NAS).  It is prudent to understand its policy and related regulations and 
orders. 
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2.3 ICAO / ATN Working Group Meetings 
 
We have observed that some security issues had been addressed by very recent 
ICAO /ATN technical working group meetings.  This is a good indication of the 
security awareness in the recent advancement of the ATN data communications.  We 
researched their minutes to keep track of the technological evolvement by the official 
ICAO / ATN working groups.  In addition, we examined the recent ATN 
publications like the 3rd edition of ATN Standards and Recommended Practices 
(SARPs).  
 
2.4 Government Standards and Procedures 
 
Understanding the government standards and procedures is by all means important in 
the study task like this for future recommendations back to the government agencies.  
The covered knowledge must expand from the existing literature (past requirements) 
to the contemporary activities (timely requirements).  As a result, we have also spent 
significant effort in the research on publications by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) and Federal Information Processing Standards 
Publications (FIPS).  The NIST is a designated standard development agency by the 
FAA. 
 
2.5 Aviation Industry Activities 
 
We also researched the concurrent aviation industry activities.  One of the timely and 
significant events is Honeywell’s press release in the Paris Air Show in June 2005.  
It announced that they successfully conducted flight tests of new secure Aircraft 
Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) recently.  We thus 
investigated the technical details of this system and assessed its technical approach 
and compared to the operational procedures of the C2 link security that we are 
interested in.  We also researched the security approach by the Global Hawk (GH) 
for its data communication implementation.  
 
2.6 Commercial Communications Industries 
 
The emerging communications in the mobile and wireless industries have been 
amazingly impressive in the past decade.  This statement applies to both business 
and technological developments.  The security aspect has been one of very critical 
requirements as well.  Thus, quite a few technological developments can be helpful 
to our functional requirement generation process. 
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2.7 Emerging Researches 
 
The research activities and topics in the academia and corporate IRAD can reflect the 
technological developments in the industry of concern.  More often, we will be able 
to sense and forecast the needs and requirements in some pressing issues.  
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3 STUDY RESULTS 
 
This section reports the findings of this communications security literature study.  
Each subsection outlines the aspects of security covered in the literature and 
summarizes its findings.  Where possible, findings that specifically address C2 link 
security are highlighted.  No attempt is made to draw any conclusion or emphasize 
any specific aspect or issue at this stage. 
 
We kept discussions of conventional security functions or techniques to a minimum 
since they are well established subjects.  For example, since encryption is a known 
technique that has been employed for information and computer data security for 
many years, it is not specifically discussed as a topic on its own or as a system 
solution.  Rather, such topics are mentioned as appropriate. 
 
3.1 Access 5 Program Internal Documents 
 
The two Access 5 internal documents [A1, A2] provide a very good introduction and 
background information about communications security related to UA flying in the 
NAS.  One source is a document, while the other is a presentation that highlights 
items from that document.  This subsection focuses on the longer document. 
 
The document uses the traditional Air-to-Ground and Ground-to-Ground 
communications infrastructure as the framework to discuss security concerns and 
recommendations.  For background, the document describes communication needs 
for ATC, C2, payload, and flight termination.  There is discussion regarding logons 
to initiate Air-to-Ground applications, ATN security services, and the significance of 
moving the ATN from Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) based protocols to 
Internet Protocol (IP) based protocols.  The bulk of the document covers security 
holes, both in the communications infrastructure and in protocol suites, and offers 
suggestions for mitigation activities and additional study. 
 
The document offers the following suggestions: 
 
1. Add authentication, non-repudiation, and encryption to the C2 link 
2. Use a “make before break” strategy for handoff 
3. Use secure routing protocols 
4. Unbundle C2, payload, and flight termination and put them in their own protected 
frequencies or RF paths 
5. Consider using ATN Version 3 standards for C2 
 
These are useful suggestions.  However, some important C2 link characteristics are 
not fully addressed, such as dynamic and timely intrusion detection and protection, 
and anti-jamming provisions, etc. 
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3.2 FAA Policy and Order 
 
It appears that the FAA Order 1370.82 is the latest and the highest authority 
document addressing the information security issue [Fa1].  It is published on June 9, 
2000 and the subject of the Order is Information Systems Security.  Its purpose is to 
establish policy and assign organizational and management responsibilities to ensure 
implementation of the Computer Security Act of 1987 along with several other 
related government laws.  This Order causes cancellation of two previous orders 
1600.54B and 1600.66 that are FAA Automated Information Systems Security 
Handbook, and Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Policy, 
respectively.  As expected, this is a very high level government document.  However, 
it provides a very useful guideline for our effort.  For example, it calls to follow the 
publications by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the 
National Security Agency (NSA) in several occasions.  This message endorses our 
study effort in various NIST documents.  In general, it is our observation that the 
FAA library tends to maintain the documents on the established regulations and 
rules.  It depends on other government standard organizations and processes, for 
example like RTCA, ICAO, and NIST, to address the emerging needs and 
requirements.  However, we have also observed that the FAA would fund the 
government sponsored research institutions to study pressing issues.  [Fa2] is the 
report prepared by the MITRE Corporation for the FAA addressing on the 
technology overview for the information system security.  This is a very timely 
research activity by the FAA.  The report discusses various technology areas such as 
authentication, access control, confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  However, 
this document serves too general purposes.  We believe that more detailed gap 
analysis and recommendation will be needed to address the C2 link security in a 
UAS. 
 
We have researched the FAA website in a great detail.  In particular, we found the 
documents provided in the Office of Assistant Administrator for Information 
Services & Chief Information Officer WebPages quite informative and useful [Fa3].  
We browsed the other related existing regulations and rules and examined the 
Technical Standard Orders (TSO) more specifically.  A TSO is a minimum 
performance standard for specified materials, parts, and appliances used on civil 
aircraft. We have not been able to find any TSO that specifically addresses the 
information security applicable to the C2 link security for a UA. 
 
3.3 ICAO / ATN 
 
We have researched the recent ICAO/ATN meeting reports on the security related 
subjects from the open literature.  Aeronautical Communications Panel (ACP) of 
ICAO established the network working group in May 2003 the first time [I2] and set 
up a sub-working group focusing on the security matter [I3].  We examined two 
meeting reports in this regard with care.  It appears that their interests have been on 
the ATS Message Handling Systems (AMHS) and the general upper layer 
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applications such as the Internet access.  Hence, they have studied the security 
tradeoffs from the IPv4 vs. IPv6 and the public key infrastructure (PKI) architecture 
points of view.  In general, the IP-based networking security is their current concern.   
 
We also examined the latest edition of the ATN Security (Volume VIII) in the ATN 
SARPs [I1] as recommended by [A1].  This manual first defines the framework 
standards that the ATN security is based on.  Four International Standard 
Organization (ISO) open system standards are designated to use: ISO/IEC 10181-1, -
2, -3, and -6.  They are Framework Overviews, Authentication Framework, Access 
Control Framework, and Integrity Framework, respectively.  These framework 
subjects are actually important security functions that we have to concern with.  This 
manual then discusses the PKI infrastructure, and the cryptographic infrastructure in 
two full separate sections.  Due to the nature of this manual, specific system security 
objects (service/application specific items) are covered in the last section of the 
document.  Overall speaking, this is an in-depth security manual developed for the 
ATN.  Most of the information can be useful for our purpose.  However, it is short of 
discussing the functions or requirements that are specific to the UAS C2 links.  For 
example, the dynamic or timely natures of the message integrity were not discussed 
in this document.   This appears to be the gap between this official ICAO ATN 
security manual and our UAS C2 link characteristics. 
 
3.4 Government Standards and Organizations 
 
It is evident from our research that we should pay close attention to the study 
subjects and the publications of the National Institute of Standard and Technology 
(NIST).  Not only has it published quite a few timely special topics in security, but it 
is one of the designated organizations by the FAA Order to provide security 
information standards and guidelines.  Recommended Security Controls for Federal 
Information Systems [N1] is one of the most recent publications that address security 
controls.  This document is generic and covering a very wide range of security 
controls, yet some applicable information and guidelines can be drawn for helping 
with the security functional requirements.  Some important examples include, but not 
limited to, periodic assessment of risk, procedures that are based on the risk 
assessment, etc. 
 
Moreover, the NIST has been interested in numerous emerging technical issues on 
security.  From the recent special publications, we can tell that they are aware of the 
emerging wireless network security concerns [N2].  WLAN defines three basic 
security services in their system.  They are authentication, confidentiality, and 
integrity.  This special publication discusses some known vulnerabilities in the 
standardized security of the 802.11 WLAN standard and the recent remedy solution 
like WAP.  It further discusses the security requirements and the threats in the 
WLAN environment.  An intrusion detection system (ISD) is considered an effective 
tool for security control.  Two tables on WLAN security checklist and WLAN risk 
and security summary in a later section contain quite interesting and useful 
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information for addressing security functional requirements. 
 
The NIST recently proposed the concept of the multi-mode authentication 
framework [N3] to address multiple-level security.  The concept is further applied to 
the electronic authentication guidelines [N4] for use in the rising e-commerce 
activities.  Enabling adequate user authentication is the first line of defense against 
unauthorized use.  We believe this multi-mode authentication / multi-level security 
should be considered a very important function for the UAS C2 link security system.   
 
We also found out that the Federal Information Processing Standards Publications 
(FIPS PUBS) is closely associated with the NIST in developing information security 
standards and procedures.  FIPS PUB-190 [F3] provides a very comprehensive 
discussion on the use of advanced authentication technology alternatives.  In the 
UAS C2 link security system, message authentication is an effective means to ensure 
timely protection.  FIPS PUB-198 [F2] is an important standard for this function.  
The technique employed in this standard incurs iterative approved cryptographic 
hash function, in combination with a shared secret key.  The cryptographic strength 
depends on the properties of the underlying hash function.    
 
FIPS PUB-199 [F1] and NIST SP-800-60 [N6] are two important documents that 
address security categorization.  This is one of the important realization functions in 
the NIST recommendation [N1]. 
 
3.5 Aviation Industry 
 
The Aircraft Data Network (ADN) subcommittee of Airlines Electronic Engineering 
Committee (AEEC) launched ADN security awareness in a recent technical meeting 
held in April 2005 [Av1].  Although the meeting discussions centered on the 
Ethernet network issues, an action item plan was called out to access the 
GSM/UMTS technology.  This was a visionary action plan to meet the ensuing 
security needs and requirements expected for emerging data communications.  The 
group security specialists recommended basing on security practices for aviation 
communication upon the common criteria published by the NIST.  The report 
outlines the security process to address three factors: protection, detection, and 
response.   
 
Honeywell’s recent press release [Av2] also shows the importance of the on-going 
security awareness when the ATN is transitioning to data communications.  They 
have successfully demonstrated secure operations for the existing ACARS.  The 
secure ACARS program was initiated and managed by the AFRL starting several 
years ago.  The strategy of this program is based on the COTS Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) and secure ATN algorithms that are extended to the ACARS 
environment.  This strategy will enable the USAF to fly in the civil air space with 
attainable investment cost while maintaining its security requirements.  The specific 
techniques employed for security protection include the elliptic curve digital 
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signature algorithm (ECDSA) scheme, the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key 
agreement scheme, and hashed message authentication code (HMAC) scheme.  They 
are all commercially off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions [Av3]. 
 
We learned that the GH security architecture is built upon the encryption methods 
that have been the standards in the military communications for years.  The GH has 
anti-jammed capability in some critical links.  We cannot report more technical 
details in this document but some of the reference documents that the GH used have 
been reviewed in this study process [Fa4, Fa5, and I4]. 
 
3.6 Commercial Communications Industry 
 
It generally consists of two major industries: wireless local area network (WLAN) 
and wireless wide area network (WWAN).  The WLAN is also known as Wi-Fi and 
it has advanced its technology through generations [C4].  The latest security scheme 
is called Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) that has incorporated user authentication 
along with temporal key integrity protocol and dynamic key distribution method, etc.  
These elements are necessary countermeasures to the threats that exist in the shared 
communications media.  The technologies adopted in the WLAN are strongly 
supported by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineer (IEEE) Standard 
Committee.  Specifically, it is IEEE Std. 802.11i [C3].   
 
The typical WWAN of our interest is 3G mobile communications that should contain 
the most advanced and matured technology.  Lessons learned from the 2G operations 
have been well incorporated into this new generation.  They have conducted 
significant threat analyses and documented in their standard publications [C1 and 
C2].  These will be important resources to our activities in the near future.  
 
The similarities of these two industries include that they deal with mobile users and 
the communication media is shared by the public.  As a result, the security integrity 
must be maintained in a dynamic and timely fashion.  These characteristics are also 
shared by the UAS C2 communications to a large extent.  Therefore, we expect that 
the security concerns studied in these two industries can be useful to the C2 link 
security functional requirement development. 
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3.7 Other Emerging Research Activities 
 
Secure mobile ad hoc networking routines and protocols seemed to be the recent 
popular topics in the academia and the corporate research activities.  Since the UAS 
C2 systems are moving around the NAS, the mobile ad hoc network concept appears 
to be applicable to our case.  So, the security concerns in these research works should 
be evaluated in our functional requirement development process.  This presents 
alternative or additional approaches to enhance communications security on the 
move [E1, E2, and E3]. 
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4 Summary of Technical Findings 
 
We first summarize the high level findings in this section.  Open issues and further 
threat study will be also discussed. 
 
 IP-based network security is the main interest of the recent ICAO/ATN 
technical activities [I1, I2, I3].  It is only a subset when considered for UAS 
C2 link security.  The noticeable gaps seem to include that no dynamic and 
timely protection concept, no anti-jamming provision are addressed in the 
traditional IP-based network.   
 The MITRE’s study report prepared for the FAA on the technology 
overview of information system security is a valuable reference for the 
functional requirement development.  It reported in Section 4.2 of [Fa2] that 
more works are needed to be done for aircraft communications and security 
in today’s aviation environment. We agree and actually expect much more 
work needed to be done for the C2 link security in tomorrow’s aviation 
environment (UAS in the NAS routinely). 
 The most recent NIST special publications covered wireless network 
security (in the area of WLAN) [N2] and proposed the multi-mode 
authentication concept subsequently leading to multi-level security [N3].  
This multi-level security concept can be an important candidate for 
functional requirements.  
 The latest security scheme (e.g., WPA) of the WLAN has been enhanced 
and supported by the IEEE standard committee.  It is designed to deal with 
mobile users. 
 AEEC points to access the GSM/UMTS technology [Av1].  We believe that 
is appropriate and applicable to the C2 communications for the UAS in 
several technical aspects. 
 The worldwide 3G consortium (closely related to GSM/UMST) has 
conducted significant security threat analyses in the mobile communication 
environment.  They have published official standards for this subject matter 
[C1, C2].  We believe this is another important resource to help the 
functional requirement development. 
 The C2 link security in the UAS environment needs to ensure not only the 
traditional (static) information data security but also the transmission 
(dynamic) security such as jam-resistance, timely authentication and 
intrusion detection, etc. 
 
As a result, we have identified some potential gaps (the best effort for now) between 
the current ICAO/ATN activities and the UAS C2 link security of our concern.  We 
have also identified various information sources that can be further investigated for 
the functional requirement development process. 
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4.1 Open Issues 
 
Is communication monitoring acceptable in the UAS environment?  The current 
ATC voice communication is clear and anyone can listen to it as long as he/she has a 
VHF radio tuned to the frequency of interest.  This is the normal condition in today’s 
aviation environment and there has been no adversary event reported due to it.  Can 
this condition be applied to the C2 link of a UAS?  At the first glance, people tend to 
say “why-not” because it has been fine in the past.  But, we need to think twice from 
the UAS operational point of view.  The flight control messages may eventually 
become clear following some “observation” time and anyone can affect flight control 
by sending messages at their disposal.  Is it adversary?   
 
Perhaps, it may be arguable that the authentication step should prevent it from 
happening.  However, it then becomes the chicken-egg argument.  In general, we 
agree with that a real effective authentication method should prevent unauthorized 
access to the link in the presence of passive listening.  But, those effective 
authentication methods often involve two-way protocols and some kind of key 
management.  The cost of separating monitoring only communications and link 
access may be very high because this has not been done in the commercial scale.  We 
believe we need to evaluate the benefit of the feature more specifically before 
opening up the option. 
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4.2 Further Threat Study 
 
ICAO has determined that denial of service, masquerade, and modification of 
information are primary threats for ATS [I5].  The technical specifications of the 
3GPP [C2] identify four threat categories on the radio interface: unauthorized access 
to data, threats to integrity, denial of service, and unauthorized access to services.    
The C2 link is expected to encounter the similar threats mentioned above. 
 
The conventional concept of protected spectrum for the ATC communications was 
good.  It was essentially based on the need of interoperability among all 
communicators in an ATC region.  The same protected spectrum concept has been 
promoted for the UAS C2 communications.  Although it is good for availability, the 
C2 link may be more vulnerable to the adverse conditions like intentional jamming.  
This kind of threat should be addressed when the protected spectrum is considered.  
For example, it will be necessary to allocate the frequency spectrum in such as a way 
that the anti-jamming techniques can be considered.  In the 3GPP threat analysis 
[C2], jamming is considered as an example of denial of service. 
 
We believe a further threat study for the UAS C2 link is appropriate.  There are some 
unique characteristics to be considered in this application area.  For example, the 
concept of timely detection and protection is very important to the UAS C2 link 
functions.  The consequence of loss of (C2 link) use or any other threat attack can be 
enormous.   
 
In addition, there are emerging RF weapon threats that have been reported by the 
National Air & Space Intelligence Center.  The impact of such threat attack can be 
catastrophic and thus cannot be ignored.  The challenge of this topic is that most of 
this kind of threat information is classified. 
 
Included in the threat study should be to examine and establish security 
categorization of the C2 information for use in the NAS [F1].  
 
. 
Working Draft September 15, 2005  
20 
The following document was prepared by a collaborative team through the noted work package.  This was 
a funded effort under the Access 5 Project. 
5 Recommendations for Functional Requirements 
 
We offer the following recommendations as the initial attempt to formulate the 
functional requirements, resulting from this limited study.  More detailed 
examinations and iterations are needed. 
 
 The UAS C2 system shall be jam-resistant and/or interference-resistant. 
 The UAS C2 system shall develop a procedure for security categorization  of 
the C2 messages 
 The UAS shall provide multi-layer security architecture: physical and link 
layers as the minimum. 
 The UAS shall authenticate each message directed to flight control. 
 The UAS shall be able to detect intrusion events and protect the system 
integrity during attacks. 
 The UAS shall be able to protect against unauthorized modification of all the 
C2 messages. 
 The UAS shall be able to protect against denial of service (DoS) attacks. 
 The UAS shall be able to provide disaster recovery and contingency 
planning during threat attacks.  
 The UAS C2 system shall include multiple control stations. 
 The operating control station shall be able to switch to a functional facility 
automatically as needed without compromising flight safety. 
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6 Acronym list 
 
ACARS Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System 
ACP Aeronautical Communications Panel 
AEEC Airlines Electronic Engineering Committee 
ADN Aircraft Data Network 
AMHS ATS Message Handling Systems 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
ATS Air Traffic Services 
ATN Aeronautical Telecommunications Network 
COP Common Operating Picture 
CPDLC Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications 
C2 Command and Control 
DoS Denial of Service 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards 
FY Fiscal Year 
GH Global Hawk 
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications 
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineer 
IP Internet Protocol 
MAC Medium Access Control 
NAS National Airspace System 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NISTIR NIST Interagency Report 
NIST SP NIST Special Publication 
NSA National Security Agency 
OSI Open Systems Interconnection 
PIC Pilot-in-Command 
PHY Physical 
PKI Public Key Infrastructure 
SARPs Standards and Recommended Practices 
TSO Technical Standard Order 
UA Unmanned Aircraft 
UAS Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System 
VHF Very High Frequency 
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network 
WPA Wi-Fi Protected Access 
WWAN Wireless Wide Area Network 
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